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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF NEPA - THE AGENCIES
MUST PLAY BY THE RULES
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
Petitioners, members of an environmental protection group, brought suit
challenging defendant Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) approval of a
construction permit for two nuclear power plants pending a complete review of requirements imposed by the National Environmental Policy Act of
19691 (NEPA). Petitioners in a second action sought review of AEC permit
granting procedures 2 to determine compliance with the NEPA. Upon consolidation for argument the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia remanded and HELD, that defendant's procedures were inadequate 3 and ordered defendant to revise its rules for strict adherence to
each procedural step mandated by the NEPA.4
Prior to the NEPA, Congress had enacted environmental protection
laws aimed at particular federal programs. 5 Such legislation, however, had
limited remedial effects because of its failure to reach all areas of environmental impact. This failure was manifest in provisions of pre-NEPA legislation, which restricted environmental considerations to a narrow range of
agency actions., When such considerations were required the agencies
needed to consider environmental effects to only a limited extent. For
example, in New Hampshire v. AEC7 the state, anticipating thermal pollution, sought to enjoin construction of a nuclear power reactor on one
of its rivers. The AEC claimed that consideration of thermal pollution was
outside its regulatory jurisdiction and granted a construction permit without
considering the environmental consequences.8 On appeal, the First Circuit
1. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1970).
2. Compare 10 C.F.R. §50, app. D 246 (1971) (AEC rules attacked by plaintiff), with
10 C.F.R. §50, app. D. 259 (1972) (AEC rules issued in compliance with the instant
decision).
3. Specifically, the court ruled that defendant's regulations violated the Act's requirements by: (1) failing to consider sufficiently the environmental values in agency review
processes; (2) failing to adopt within an appropriate time rules requiring consideration
of environmental impact; (3) declining to conduct independent environmental impact
evaluations when action had been certified by another state or federal agency; and (4) refusing to apply the NEPA to AEC-regulated projects begun before its enactment.
4. 449 F.2d 1109, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT: ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 180-87
(1971) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT]. See, e.g.,
Parker v. United States, 809 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970) (interpreting the Wilderness
Act, 16 U.S.C. §1131 (1970)).
6. See, e.g., National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. §§l, 20 (1970).
7. 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969). But see Citizens Comm.
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), afJ'g 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (Corps of Engineers must consider a highway project as a whole and not their
actions alone).
8. New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1969).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1972

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1972], Art. 14
1972]

CASE COMMENTS

Court of Appeals held the AEC, under its pre-NEPA statutory mandate,V
need consider only specific radiological hazards and not broader environmental impactsio such as thermal pollution.
Furthermore, policies and conduct of federal agencies have occasionally
conflicted with environmental protection and the public interest." The
NEPA was developed and instituted amid rising public concern about such
confficts, 2 and the Act is currently the major statutory tool for insuring
environmental quality in federal activities. 3 Designed as an agency regulating statute,' 4 the NEPA applies to all federal agency actions having potential impact upon the environment. 5 Through the NEPA, Congress has
equipped all agencies with environmental regulatory authority and the responsibility to exercise it. 16
This policy was declared to insure that federal action did not contribute
to environmental problems.17 The Act's substantive policy requires the
federal government to "use all practicable means and measures"'i s to protect environmental values, and demands that certain procedural requirements 9 be followed "to the fullest extent possible." 20 The objective was to
build into the agency decisionmaking process a systematic and careful consideration of the environmental impact of any proposed action 2' and to
codify a continuing federal responsibility to restore and preserve the en2
vironment. 2

9. 42 U.S.C. §2011 (1970).
10. 406 F.2d at 175-76. But see Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec.
Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965) (indicates that federal agencies should consider the
public interest).
11. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751, 2753 (1969).
12. S. RP. No. 296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1969).
13. ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY REPORT 156.
14. Note, Retroactive Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
22 HASTNGS L.J. 805, 808 (1971).
15. Regulatory activities of federal environmental protection agencies are not deemed
"actions" that require preparation of an environmental impact statement. Council on
Environmental Quality Interim Guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. 7390 (1970).
16. Note, supra note 14.
17. See Peterson, An Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 1 ELR 50,036 (1971).
18. 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1970) is a congressional declaration of federal policy to use all
practicable means and measures in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare. It is also designated to create harmony between man and nature.
19. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970) provides that all agencies of the federal government shall
use a systematic, interdisciplinary approach in planning and decisionmaking; shall develop
methods to consider the environment in the decisionmaking process; include in all reports
a detailed environmental impact statement; and shall study and develop alternatives to
any proposed action.
20. Id.
21. Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7723 (1971).
22. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
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Despite its recent enactment, specific issues concerning NEPA 23 have
already been decided by the courts.2 4 A wide range of individuals and groups
have been granted standing to assert governmental non-compliance with the
NEPA.2 5 While the courts have declined to apply the NEPA retroactively 26
the Act has been applied to incompleted portions of projects begun before
2
the passage of the NEPA. 7

Prior interpretations of the NEPA involved federal agencies that had
drawn up procedures in response to the NEPA's procedural requirements,
but violated their own procedures in specific actions.2s Although a few
cases implied that agency procedures failed to conform with the NEPA the
cases were decided on other grounds. For example, in Texas Committee on
Natural Resources v. Resor29 the district court, enjoining construction of

a dam, stated "insofar as [those facts were] concerned" the agency procedures did not incorporate an interdisciplinary approach to environmental
planning and evaluation. 30 Similar language is found in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers3' where plaintiffs sought to enjoin work on the Gillham Dam Project in Arkansas, alleging that the Corps'
procedures had not complied with the NEPA. In issuing an injunction the
district court noted that the procedures followed did not permit assignment of values to environmental factors in carrying out the NEPA's bal2
ancing of costs and benefits.3

The court's decisions in both cases were limited to the projects under
consideration and did not challenge agency rules. In the instant case, however, the court challenged both the agency's rules and their application.
The court objected to defendant's regulations on grounds that they failed

23. For general interpretations of the NEPA see Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th
Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971);
Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RuTrGERs L. REv. 230 (1970); Peterson, supra note 17;
Note, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep) in Wolf's Clothing?, 37
L. REV. 139 (1970).

BROOKLYN

24. Partial lists of cases may be found for the period of Jan. 1, 1970 to Sept. 1970 and
the period to Aug. 1971 in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT 156-70; Peterson, supra note 17.
25. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Wilderness Soc'y
v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). See also ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT 156-60,
167-68; Peterson, supra note 17.
26. Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 126-27 (D. Alaska 1971); Brooks v. Volpe,
319 F. Supp. 90 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp.
1038 (D. Ore. 1970). See Note, supra note 14.
27. See Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
28. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th
Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
29. Civil Action No. 549, ELR 20,466 (E.D. Tex. June 29, 1971).
30. Id.

31. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
32. Id. at 757.
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to sufficiently consider environmental values in agency review processes, 33
omitted independent AEC evaluation when a project had been certified
as meeting the minimum standards of another state or federal agency, 34 failed
to require consideration of environmental impact long after the NEPA's
adoption, 35 and refused to apply the NEPA to projects begun before its adoption.36 The court noted defendant's procedures were at issue and particularly emphasized the distinction between the substantive duties imposed
by the NEPA,3 7 which leave an agency room for discretion, and the procedural provisions of the NEPA, 33 which are "not highly flexible."' s
The instant court dealt extensively with the first two issues and discussed the AEC's duty under the detailed statement section.40 Defendant's
procedures provided that although a detailed environmental statement
would "accompany" an application through the AEC review process, it
would not come before the reviewing board or influence the agency's decision unless a party to the proceeding affirmatively raised an environmental
issue.41 The court considered such an implementation of the NEPA to be
a "mockery of the Act," 42 and read the word "accompany" in the NEPA
as displaying a legislative intent that the detailed environmental state43
ment be considered at every stage of the agency review process.
44
The court relied on the plain wording of the NEPA in invalidating
defendant's rule that omitted independent evaluation and balancing of
proposed action that had been certified by the appropriate agency to meet
minimal environmental standards. 45 Specifically, the defendant had accepted findings of state agencies, approved by the federal government under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,4 6 that supported the AEC proj4
ect as meeting water quality standards. 7
The court's construction of the intent of the Senate proponents of the
NEPA is questionable.-8 On its face, the NEPA does not require an agency
to act or refrain from acting when a project within its purview has been

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

449 F.2d at 1117.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1127.
42 US.C. §4331 (1970).

38. 42 U.S.C. §§4332-34 (1970).
39. 449 F.2d at 1112.
40. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2) (C) (1970) (requires agencies to prepare a detailed statement
analyzing the environmental impact of the proposed action, any adverse environmental
effects, and any alternatives to the action).
41. 10 C.F.R. §50, app. D 246, 249-12, -13 (1971).
42. 449 F.2d at 1117.
43. Id. at 1117-18.
44. Id. at 1125-27.
45. 10 C.F.R. §50, app. D 246, 249-11 (b) (1971).
46. 33 U.S.C. §1171 (1970).
47. 449 F.2d at 1122.
48. 115 CONG. REc. 29,053, 29,056 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson indicating that
licensing agencies, specifically the AEC, would not have to make a detailed statement on
water quality if an appropriate agency had made a certification).
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certified by any other state or federal agency. 49 The intent of the Act's proponents, at least their intent concerning certification of water quality
standards,50 was that when a project met the water quality standards of
another state or federal agency the licensing agency would not have to
make its own detailed statement on water quality.51 Although the defendant's
extension of such procedures beyond water quality to include any environmental effect certified by another agency could conceivably be justified
in light of such statements, the court did not uphold that procedure even
for water quality.52 The rationale for rejecting this approach was that the
NEPA requires the economic and technical benefits of a planned action
to be assessed and weighed against environmental costs. 53 Only through
individualized balancing analysis could the defendant or any other agency
insure that the most beneficial action is taken. Moreover, an entirely different
kind of judgment is used by a certifying agency. Instead of a balancing
analysis, a certifying agency merely determines the magnitude of certain
environmental costs and whether these costs exceed predetermined mini4
Mums. 5 Certifying agencies do not weigh environmental costs against opposing benefits. Therefore, defendant's collection of certificates did not meet
the NEPA's balancing mandate. 55
While the defendant relied on statements of the Act's major proponents, 56
the use of the congressional "section-by-section analysis" and the statute's
plain language leads to an opposite conclusion. The analysis of that section- 7
stated its purpose was to insure that an agency did not substitute the procedures in the NEPA for more restrictive procedures established by any
other law. 58 A lower court interpreted this section, 9 in dicta, to allow
the Secretary of Transportation to rely on certificates submitted to him to
approve a highway project.6 0 As the instant court noted, however, certifying
agencies establish only minimum conditions for a project's environmental
effect and do not preclude the reviewing agency, here the AEC, from de-

49.

42 U.S.C. §4334(3) (1970).

50. 33 U.s.c. §1171 (1970).
51. 115 CONG. REc. 29,052-56 (1969).
52. 449 F.2d at 1122-27.
53. Id. at 1123.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 115 CONG. Rac. 29,052-56 (1969) (remarks of Senators Jackson and Muskie clarifying
the compromise reached between the NEPA and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, which would have dispensed with the need for licensing agencies to make detailed
environmental impact statements on water quality if an appropriate agency had made a
certification).
57. 42 U.S.C. §4334 (1970).
58. 115 CONG. Rc. 40,420 (1969).
59. Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 249 (M.D. Pa.
1970) (the Secretary was not required to make independent determination of environmental
impact of the project because it would place a staggering burden on the Secretary and
would only duplicate prior investigations and determinations).
60. Id.
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manding stricter controls. 61 The remaining aspects of the defendant's discussion of legislative intent were dismissed by the court, which described
the legislative history as "meager,"62 and maintained that such history could
not change the meaning of the clear and plain wording of the certifying
section.

63

The court's discussion of the final issues was brief. While holding that
the AEC's delay in implementation was unacceptable, the court recognized
that time was needed to provide an orderly period of transition from preNEPA conforming procedures." The fourteen months taken by the AEC,
however, was held excessive for two reasons. First, the agency was already
organized to review health and safety impacts of its licensing decisions.65
Second, the importance of the NEPA's requirement of any environmental
consideration during the agency review process necessitated implementation
"at a pace faster than a funeral procession."66 Adding to the AEC's unfavorable position was its refusal to apply the NEPA to unlicensed projects
granted construction permits prior to the NEPA's adoption.67 The court's
holding as to delay in implementation seems warranted in light of the decisions applying NEPA to ongoing projects. Gs Furthermore, delaying NEPA
review until a project is actually considered for licensing imposes prohibitive
modification cost, which thereby impairs the cost-benefit analysis required
by the NEPA.69
The immediate effect of the instant decision will be to place federal
agencies on notice that both the substantive and procedural requirements
of the NEPA will be strictly enforced.70 In particular, federal agencies must
procedurally implement a systematic balancing analysis in each agency action
affecting the environment. The results of such a balancing analysis must be
included in a detailed statement of environmental impact.71
The instant court's conclusion that federal agencies must strictly adhere
to the NEPA indicates that the courts will go beyond the letter of the NEPA
in protecting the environment. A possible extension of this decision could
be the enforcement of the duty to protect environmental values72 to the same
extent as procedural duties. Thus, procedural duties and arguably even
discretionary duties imposed by the NEPA may be strictly construed.

61. 449 F.2d at 1124.

62. Id. at 1126.
63. Id.

64. Id. at 1120.
65. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
66. 449 F.2d at 1122.
67. Id. at 1127.

68. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
69. 449 F.2d at 1128.
70. Id. at 1114.
71.

Id.

72. 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1970).
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